Arbitrated quantum signature (AQS) schemes use quantum cryptography to ensure their security, and the schemes provide that the signature receiver verifies the signature with the arbitrator's assistance. Very recently, Gao and Choi found in some previous AQS schemes, the receiver, Bob can counterfeit the signer's signature under known message. Additionally, the paper gives the security analysis of the AQS scheme, and results show that not only the receiver, but also the attacker can forge the signature in the AQS scheme. Furthermore, the signer can successfully disavow any message she ever signed. To conquer these shortcomings, this paper gives a new AQS scheme without quantum entangled state; it uses special quantum logic gate and new quantum one-time pads to ensure its security. Compares with other previous AQS schemes, the new scheme has following advantages: (1) the new scheme guarantees the receiver and the attacker cannot forge the signature; (2) Because the new scheme does not use quantum entangled states, so it can reduce the complexity of implementation and provides a higher efficiency in transmission; (3) The receiver, Bob has verified the signature's integrity, so Alice cannot disavow her having signed message.
Introduction
Digital signature is very important in cryptography. The digital signature has the function of non-disavowal and message authentication. Because of impossible of counterfeiting or disavowing, digital signature is very important in the modem electronic data processing system. Arbitrated signature is a special signature, which provides the sender sign the signature, and the receiver verifies the signature with the arbitrator's assistance.
As everyone know, the security of traditional digital signature is based on the assumption of mathematical computational complexity, such as the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) or factoring large numbers problem(RSA). However, if quantum computer is invented someday, most of the traditional digital signature schemes would be broken easily by Shor's algorithm [1] . Differs from the classical cryptography, quantum cryptography ensure its security by physical principles. The quantum cryptography gives us unconditional security by quantum no-cloning theorem and the Heisenberg uncertainty principle.
So, many researchers and scholars had shown interests in quantum signature schemes and some progress has been made on quantum signature schemes [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] . Quantum signature depends on fundamental laws of quantum key distribution (QKD) [17] [18] , which can be proved to be unconditional security [19] [20] [21] [22] .
If the quantum signature scheme is secure, it must satisfies two characteristics: (1) no one include the receiver can forge the signature, even if the attacker intercepts the signature; (2) the signer cannot disavow her having signed the message and the receiver
Brief Review of arbitrated quantum signature (AQS) scheme using Quantum Entangled States
Step 1: the receiver Bob gets her private key shared with the arbitrator Chile by BB84 or EPR protocol, it can be proved unconditional security. Similarly, the signer Alice also gets his private key shared with the arbitrator Chile. Therefor Chile had the Alice's and Bob's private key, so she can help Bob to verify the signature.
Step 2: The signer, Alice generates n EPR pairs or GHZ pairs |   =
Then, Alice distributes one particle of EPR pairs or GHZ to Bob, and the other to herself.
Step 3: For (i=1 to n), Alice combines each qubit message state | i P  with the EPR pairs or GHZ pairs | i   , then she gets the result | i A  , denoted by
Step 4: Alice measures the Bell | A  and gets the measurement |
Step 5: Alice generates the quantum signature with quantum one-time pads by Alice's private key [23] , denoted as | (| )
Step 6: Alice sends the quantum signature | S  , the quantum message | P  and the measurement | A M  to the signature receiver Bob through a quantum channel.
Step 7: When the receiver Bob receives the quantum signature, he sends the quantum signature to the arbitrator Chile directly.
Step 8: Subsequently, the arbitrator Chile generates the encrypted message | ' (| ) A K S E P    with quantum message | P  and Alice's private key. Then, Chile compares |' S  with | S  as the Ref. [24] .
Step 9: After that, the arbitrator Chile use Bob's private key to encrypt the judgment V, the quantum signature | S  and the quantum message | P  ; then, she sends it back to the receiver Bob.
Step 10: Finally, Bob recovers the quantum message | B P  by quantum teleportation. Then, Bob compares the quantum message | P  with the recovered
The First Forge Method: In
Step 6, Alice transfers the quantum signature | S  , the quantum message | P  and the measurement | Although the attacker doesn't know the context of the quantum signature | S  , the context of the quantum message | P  and Alice's private key A K , she also can forge the signature. Because the traditional quantum one-time pads don't suit for the quantum signature, the receiver Bob can successfully forge a signature after he receives a valid signature pairs. According to these AQS schemes, from the Eq.(1), we can know a valid signature | S  of quantum message | P  should be
Note that, the attacker, Eve cannot know Alice's secret key PS  will also be a valid quantum message and quantum signature. The forge attack method can be described as follows:
(1) When Alice transfers ( 
(3) For (i=1 to n), Eve performs the same Pauli operation i U on every encrypted quantum message | i P  , then she gets the forged quantum message |' P  International Journal of Security and Its Applications Vol.9, No. 1 (2015) 80
But there is only one question, that is the receiver recovers the quantum message | P  by the measurement | A M  . So, if Eve only forges the quantum signature | US  and forges the quantum message | UP  , because the recovered message | P  will not equal to | UP  , in Step 10, the receiver Bob would find some one has forged the signature. So Eve must forge the measurement | A M  .
The results of the measurement |' i A M  is described as the Table1. 
The equation can be described as follows: 
Because, every qubit |
 is a pure state of a single particle. Therefore, all the minus signs in Eq. (6) are global phases and can be omitted. So, we can get
As the Eq.(6) proposed, | ' 
As the Ref. [25] proposed, the receiver, Bob recovers the quantum message |' B P  from the forged measurement |' A M  and EPR state | B 
From the Eq.(9), we can know | ' and sends it back to the Bob, it can be described  , the arbitrator, Chile will stand on the side of Alice and regards Bob's has modified the signature [9] .
On the other hand, because not only the receiver but also the attacker can forge the signature under known message, if there are some arguments between Alice and Bob, Alice can disavow her having signed the message. If Bob holds | S  as Alice's signature for the quantum message | P  , while Alice can claim that the signature has been forge someone, and she claims the valid si gnature is | US  for the quantum message | UP  . And in this situation, no one can detect whether Alice tell a lie or not. So, Alice can disavow the signature.  . The new scheme involves three partners, Alice is defined as the signer; Bob is defined as the receiver; and Chile is defined as the arbitrator, who helps Bob to verify the signature.
New Arbitrated Quantum Signature Scheme without Entangled state

Initialization Stage
Step I1: the signer, Alice obtains her signing private keys shared with the arbitrator Chile through quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols, where , which can be proved unconditionally secure [19] [20] [21] [22] . Similarly, the receiver, Bob obtains his verifying private key Step I2: Alice gets her transmission private key 12 
with the receiver Bob.
Signing Stage
Step S1: The signer, Alice generates four copies of quantum string message | P  (two copies to produce the secret qubit string |' P  , and two copies to generate the signature | A S  ).
Step S2: Alice chooses a number r∈ 2 {0 ,1} n randomly, and then she encrypts four copies quantum message | P  into the cipher text |' P  with quantum one-time pads [ (11) Step S3: Alice uses her signing private key A K to encrypts two copies |' P  into two copies quantum signature | A S  (denotes as
Here S is defined by
And H is the Hadamard transform, which is defined
Step S4: Alice generates | B S  with her transmission private key AB K .
Step S5: For convenient, the encrypted quantum message |' P  denoted as 1 |' P  , 2 |' P  . Alice uses AB K to generates the signature | S  with quantum onetime pads [23] ,
Then, she sends | S  to Bob through a quantum channel.
Verification Stage
Step V1: The receiver, Bob decrypts | S  with Alice's transmission private key AB K , and gets
Step V2: Bob decrypts | B S  by AB K , and gets |' A S  as follows:
Here ' S is defined by , it means that ( | 0
Step V3: First, Bob compares two quantum string |' A S  with 2 | A S  as the approach in Ref. [24] . Then he compares two quantum encrypted message At last she publishes V by the public board (or encrypts V and sends or sends it through a classical public communications channel).
Step V5: If V =1, Bob informs Alice to publish r, and Alice publishes r by the public board.
Step V6: Bob recovers the original quantum message | P  by r,
Finally, Bob holds ( 2 | A S  ,r) as Alice's signature for the message | P  . The communications in new arbitrated quantum signature scheme is described in Figure 1 . 
After that, she sends |' S  to Bob. Bob can detect Eve has forged the signature as follows:
First Bob gets the forged message 1 | ''
Second Bob gets the forged signature |'  , and will find some one has forged the signature.
So, in the new AQS scheme, the attacker Eve cannot forge the signature.
Bob cannot Forge the Signature:
Suppose the receiver, Bob wants to replace Alice to sign the message. The scheme also can resist the receiver Bob forging signature. Because with the unconditionally secure quantum key distribution and the Lee's scheme using public board [5] Lee's scheme without public board [5] Li's scheme [6] Zou's scheme [8] New scheme 
Conclusions
This article has shown that in some AQS schemes, the receiver and the attacker can forge the signature and the signer can disavow her signature. To conquer these shortcomings, a new AQS scheme has been proposed. The scheme can provide its security by employing QKD techniques [17] [18] and new quantum one-time pads. The proposed AQS scheme uses special quantum logical gate to resist known message attack. Compares with other AQS schemes [2, [5] [6] 8] , the new scheme can offer a higher efficiency in transmission. So it is an effective secure arbitrated quantum signature scheme.
